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MIOHIGAN LAW RiEVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--SLF-INRIMINATION-RELATION To LoYALTY Dis-
CIHARGfl FROM GovEaiuqmlNrr SRvlvicE-A doctor, drafted into the Army as a
private by authority of the Doctors Draft Law,' exercised his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to complete a loyalty certificate
required for a military commission.2 The Army refused to grant the commission.
In a prior habeas corpus proceeding,3 he had been ordered discharged unless
granted the commission. Since the Army intended to grant the discharge under
conditions other than honorable,4 the doctor sought an injunction to compel
prompt honorable discharge. Held, injunction granted. Exercise of the consti-
tutional privilege in refusing to complete a loyalty certificate could not be
considered a confession of guilt of subversive association or activities, and, in
absence of other grounds, the doctor was entitled to an honorable discharge.
Levin v. Gillespie, (D. C. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 726.
The original Doctors Draft Law5 was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Orloff.v. Willoughby6 to allow the Army to refuse discharges to and withhold
commissions from doctors who refused to answer questions concerning possible
subversive associations. After the 1953 amendment required the commissioning
of qualified doctors,7 the Fourth Circuit in Nelson v. Peckham8 held that such
doctors must be released from service unless accorded appropriate rank or grade.
The present case is the first in which the nature of the discharge has been at
issue. To answer the contention that an exercise of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination was tantamount to a confession of guilt of subversive
activities, the court quoted from Spector v. United States.9 'The privilege is
for the innocent as well as the guilty and no inference can be drawn against the
person claiming it that he fears that he is 'engaged in doing something forbidden
164 Stat. L. 826, §4(i)(1) (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §454(i)(1). See
Bertelsen v. Cooney, (5th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 275, where the constitutionalit of this
statute was upheld.
2The required form, "Loyalty Certificate for Personnel of the Armed Forces," specifi-
cally allows the exercise of the federal constitutional privilege.
3 Levin v. Gillespie, (D.C. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 239.
4 An enlisted man may receive one of the following types of discharge: honorable,
general, undesirable, bad conduct, dishonorable. The last three are granted under condi-
tions other than honorable. A.R. 615-360.
5 64 Stat. L. 828, §4 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §454a provided that a drafted
doctor ". . . may . . . be promoted to such grade or rank . . . commensurate with his
medical or dental education, experience, and ability."
6 345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534 (1953), noted in 67 HAzv. L. REv. 102 (1953).
7 67 Stat. L. 87, §3 (1953), 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. I, 1954) §454a changed "may"
to "shall." See note 5 supra.
8 (4th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 574, followed in Peck v. Carpenter, (D.C. Cal. 1954)
120 F. Supp. 560.
9 (9th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 1002 at 1006.
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by federal law."'",0 The court may well have been influenced by plaintiff's
assertion that an undesirable discharge would seriously impair his reputation
and civilian professional status. The decision in the present case seemingly
ignores an applicable Army regulation adverse to plaintiff," thereby indicating
a definite acceptance of the doctor's position. The ratio decidendi of the present
case is opposed to recent trends in federal and state loyalty dismissals.
12 Wit-
nesses under oath in criminal prosecutions and before congressional committees,
grand juries and certain administrative agencies may properly claim the privi-
lege against self-incrimination if the requested testimony would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed for a later criminal prosecution.' 3 However,
refusal to testify upon this ground before a congressional committee regarding
charges of alleged disloyalty is officially considered in determining whether the
retention of a federal employee is "clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security."'14 Federal loyalty dismissals without the safeguards of a judi-
cial trial have been upheld 15 in accordance with the principle that government
employees have no constitutionally protected property rights to their positions.'6
The governmental interest in eliminating possible disloyalty has overcome the
argument that a federal loyalty dismissal with its stigma to reputation and
prejudice to earning power amounts to unconstitutional punishment.' 7  It is
also well established that a state may require a loyalty oath as a condition of
10 Principal case at 727. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2250, 2251 (1940)
for a full discussion of the history and policy of the self-incrimination privilege.
11 A.R. 615-370 indicates that enlisted personnel are not entitled to an honorable
discharge if they have "failed to divulge any material detail relative to [subversive] activity
or association ... prior to entry on active duty."
12 The present case is distinguishable from most loyalty dismissals where the employee
desires to continue his employment. It is possible that some doctors or dentists not desiring
to serve in the army could take advantage of this method of avoiding their military obliga-
tions.
'3 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223 (1950); Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814 (1951). This privilege is subject to the operation of
the waiver doctrine, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951); and to
the Witness Immunity Act of 1954, P.L. 600, 16 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News (1954)
5114.
14Exec. Ord. 10450, §8(a)(8), 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 29, 1953), as amended by
Exec. Ord. 10491, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583 (Oct. 16, 1953).
15 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, affd. by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951). Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F.
(2d) 783. See Gardner, "Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States,"
33 Bost. UNIV. L. RV. 176 (1953).
'6Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 at 577, 20 S.Ct. 890 (1900); Crenshaw v.
United States, 134 U.S. 99 at 108, 10 S.Ct. 431 (1890), 99 A.L.R. 336 at 341 (1935).
But see Dawley, "The Governor's Constitutional Powers of Appointment and Removal," 22
MmN. L. R.v. 451 at 474 (1938).
17 Bailey v. Richardson, note 15 supra. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66
S.Ct. 1073 (1946), had held that a congressional attempt to compel dismissals of desig-
nated federal employees was equivalent to criminal punishment and unconstitutional as
being a bill of attainder and ex post facto. On the federal loyalty program, see Emerson
and Helfeld, "Loyalty among Government Employees," 58 YA.LE L.J. 1 (1948), and
Richardson, 'The Federal Employee Loyalty Program," 51 CoL. L. RPv. 546 (1951).
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employment,"" or dismiss educators who invoke the self-incrimination privilege
in response to congressional or state inquiry as to subversive associations. 19 How-
ever, there is some judicial recognition of the "badge of infamy.., visited upon
a person excluded from public employment on disloyalty grounds."20 If the
principles of the present case were applied broadly in loyalty dismissals based
on the assertion of the self-incrimination privilege, the result might be to require
the dismissing agency to indicate the specific reason for dismissal, and to require
a statement that the use of this constitutional privilege is not tantamount to
proven disloyalty. This might mitigate the possible stigma to reputation and
prejudice to future employment resulting from loyalty dismissals. However,
such principles are not likely to be adopted because of the present world situa-
tion and because of the popular view that this privilege would not ordinarily be
claimed by a patriotic citizen with nothing to hide.
George E. Eaing
18 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952); Garner v. Board
of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951). See also Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 74 S.Ct. 650 (1954).
19 Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E. (2d) 373 (1954);
Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, (Mass. 1954) 120 N.E. (2d) 772; Steinmetz v.
California State Board of Education, (Cal. 1954) 271 P. (2d) 614.20Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 190, 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952), which indicates
that an unfair loyalty oath requirement results in the arbitrary dismissal of state employees,
and that arbitrary dismissal is a denial of due process. It might be argued that a dismissal
based on the exercise of the privilege is also arbitrary. See also Hamilton v. Brennan, 203
Misc. 536, 119 N.Y.S. (2d) 83 (1953).
